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Jaffe and Palmer (1997) present three distinct variants of the so-called Porter Hypothesis.  The “weak” 
version of the hypothesis posits that environmental regulation will stimulate certain kinds of 
environmental innovations.  The “narrow” version of the hypothesis asserts that flexible environmental 
policy regimes give firms greater incentive to innovate than prescriptive regulations, such as 
technology-based standards.  Finally, the “strong” version posits that properly designed regulation may 
induce cost-saving innovation that more than compensates for the cost of compliance. In this paper, we 
test the significance of these different variants of the Porter Hypothesis using data on the four main 
elements of the hypothesised causality chain (environmental policy, research and development, 
environmental performance and commercial performance).  The analysis is based upon a unique 
database which includes observations from approximately 4200 facilities in seven OECD countries. In 
general, we find strong support for the “weak” version, qualified support for the “narrow” version, and 
qualified support for the “strong” version as well.  
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Porter (Porter, 1991; Porter and van der Linde, 1995) has suggested that pollution is generally 
associated with a waste of resources, or with lost energy potential:  “Pollution is a 
manifestation of economic waste and involves unnecessary or incomplete utilisation of 
resources… Reducing pollution is often coincident with improving productivity with which 
resources are used” (Porter and van der Linde 1995: 98, 105).  From this reasoning, Porter 
argues that ‘properly designed environmental regulation can trigger innovation that may 
partially or more than fully offset the costs of complying with them’ (1995, p.98).  This has 
come to be known as the Porter Hypothesis (PH).  In other words, it is possible to reduce 
pollution and costs at the same time, resulting in “win-win” situations, contrary to the 

















The Porter Hypothesis is controversial.  First, the evidence initially provided in its support is 
based on small number of company case studies, in which firms were able to reduce both their 
pollution emissions and their production costs. As such, it can hardly be generalized to the 
entire population of firms.  Second, economists would suggest that, in a perfectly competitive 
economy, if there are opportunities to reduce costs and inefficiencies, companies could 
identify them by themselves without the help of the government (Oates et al.  1995).  
  2 
Indeed, Ambec and Barla (2005) argue that, analytically speaking, for the Porter Hypothesis to 
be valid, at least one market imperfection is required in addition to the environmental 
externality. Examples of such market failures include spillovers in knowledge (Jaffe et al., 
2004) or in learning-by-doing (Mohr, 2002), or market power (Simpson and Bradford, 1996, 
Greaker, 2003). Alternatively, they may arise out of systemic organisational failures within the 
firm, such as contractual incompleteness (Ambec and Barla, 2005), asymmetric information 
(Ambec and Barla, 2002), and agency control problems (Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné 2002). 
 
Jaffe and Palmer (1997) present three distinct variants of PH.  In their framework, the “weak” 
version of the hypothesis is that environmental regulation will stimulate certain kinds of 
environmental innovations, although there is no claim that the direction or rate of this 
increased innovation is socially beneficial.  The “narrow” version of the hypothesis asserts that 
flexible environmental policy instruments such as pollution charges or tradable permits give 
firms greater incentive to innovate than prescriptive regulations, such as technology-based 
standards.  Finally, the “strong” version posits that properly designed regulation may induce 
innovation that more than compensate for the cost of compliance. While many researchers 
have tested different versions of the Porter Hypothesis empirically, the studies are often partial 
and the results ambiguous (see next section below). 
 
Given the growing importance of environmental issues in public policy, the challenging and 
controversial nature of the Porter Hypothesis, and the mitigated nature of the empirical results 
obtained thus far, assessment of the hypotheses remains an open research question. In this 
paper, we use a unique database collected by the OECD in 2003 to test the significance of all 
the links in the causality chain presented above.  This database includes observations from 
approximately 4200 facilities in seven OECD countries (USA, Canada, Japan, Germany, 
France, Hungary and Norway).  Data was collected on the perceived stringency of the 
environmental policy regime, the use of different policy instruments (command-and-control 
regulation, environmentally related taxes, etc.), R&D expenditures allocated specifically to 
environmental matters, environmental performance with respect to a number of different 
  3impacts, business performance, and a number of control variables
2.  To our knowledge, this is 
the first study to test all the variants of the Porter Hypothesis using data on the four main 
elements of the causality chain (environmental policies of different types, technological 
innovation, environmental performance and commercial performance).  This allows us to 
obtain greater insight on the mechanisms at play, and on the empirical validity of the Porter 
Hypothesis. 
     
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief literature review on 
the empirical work related to the Porter Hypothesis. A more complete review can be found in 
Ambec and Barla (2006), Ambec and Lanoie (2007). Section 3 presents the empirical model, 
the econometric strategy and the data. Section 4 outlines the empirical results, while Section 5 
provides concluding remarks     
 
2. Literature survey  
 
We distinguish two broad sets of empirical studies. A first set estimates the impact of 
environmental regulations on firm’s innovation policy and technological choice, as measured 
by investment in R&D, in capital and new technologies, or successful patent applications. 
These studies test the first premise of the Porter Hypothesis that more stringent environmental 
regulations enhance innovation, or the “weak” version.  None of them really present 
information on the “narrow” version of the PH, although some of them provide indirect 
evidence in this area as well, as will be discussed below.  In the second set, the impact of 
environmental regulation is estimated on measures of firms’ performance, such as productivity 
and costs. The aim is to test whether more stringent environmental policies can be 
commercially beneficial to the firm, i.e. the “strong” version. Yet these papers are silent on the 
process that leads to higher productivity.  
 
In the first set of papers, Jaffe and Palmer (1997) estimate the relationship between total R&D 
expenditures and the number of successful patent applications on pollution  abatement costs (a 
proxy for the stringency of environmental regulation) in U.S. manufacturing. They found a 
                                                 
2 Johnstone at al. (2007a) discuss the background of the project, and present an overview of the data. 
  4positive link with R&D expenditures (an increase of 0.15% in R&D expenditures for a 
pollution abatement cost increase of 1%), but no statistically significant link with the number 
of patents. Also drawing upon U.S. data, but restricting themselves to environmentally-related 
successful patents, Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) found a positive but small relationship 
with environmental regulation. Both studies suggest a weak but positive link between a more 
stringent environmental policy regimes and the firm’s innovation policy.  Popp (2006) 
provides evidence that the introduction of environmental regulation on sulphur dioxide in the 
U.S., and on nitrogen dioxides in Germany and Japan, was shortly followed by a very 
significant increase in the number of relevant patents. Arimura et al. (2007a) found a positive 
and significant relationship between environmental regulation stringency and the probability 
of investing in environmental R&D. 
 
Interestingly, in the same vein, two studies find a negative relationship between environmental 
regulations and investment in capital. Nelson et al. (1993) found that air pollution regulations 
significantly increased the age of capital in U.S. electric utilities in the 1970s, with the age of 
capital assumed to be negatively related with environmental performance. According to Gray 
and Shadbegian (1998, 2003), more stringent air and water regulations have a significant 
impact on paper mills’ technological choice in the U.S. However, their results suggest that it 
tends to divert investment from productivity to abatement, consistent with the standard 
paradigm. 
 
The second set of studies, which focuses on the effects of regulation on productivity, has a 
long tradition in economic literature (see Jaffe et al., 1995, for a review). Most papers 
reviewed in Jaffe et al. (1995) highlight a negative impact of environmental regulation on 
productivity. For instance, Gallop and Robert (1983) estimated that SO2 regulations slowed 
down productivity growth in the U.S. in the seventies by 43%.  More recent papers find 
positive results more in line with the “strong” version.  For example, Berman and Bui (2001) 
report that refineries located in the Los Angeles area enjoyed a significantly higher 
productivity than other U.S. refineries despite a more stringent air pollution regulation in this 
area. Similarly, Alpay et al. (2002) estimated the productivity of the Mexican food processing 
  5industry to be increasing with the pressure of environmental regulation. They therefore 
suggest that a more stringent regulation is not always detrimental to productivity
3.  
 
As mentioned above, due to data availability, no study has been able to conduct a direct test of 
the “narrow” version of PH, which hypothesises that market-based instruments are more likely 
than traditional “command-and control” measures to induce environmental innovation.   
However, Burtraw (2000) provides indirect support showing that the change in environmental 
regulation for SO2 emissions in the U.S. from a technology-based standard with emission caps 
to an emission allowance trading program in 1990, considerably reduced compliance costs 
(40% to 140% lower than projected). It not only encouraged innovation, but also fostered 
organisational change and competition on upstream input markets. The program was 
progressive, with permits falling from 2.5 pounds SO2  per Btu of head input in 1995 to 1.2 in 
2000, with a banking system. Firms took advantage of relatively low-cost compliance options 
in the early years of the program to bank allowances and, therefore, smoothed their abatement 
costs over time. A popular strategy was a switch to the use of coal with lower sulphur content.  
This resulted in more intense competition in the markets for high-sulphur and low-sulphur 
coal, which reduced the price of inputs.  The industry also experienced technological 
innovation with respect to fuel blending and in the scrubber market. The former “command-
and-control” regulations had not provided incentives to increase SO2 removal by scrubbers by 
more than the 90% or 70% prescribed in the standard. With the new program, there were 
incentives for further upgrading of scrubber efficiency.  
 
Furthermore, a number of papers have emerged from the OECD project from which the data 
for this paper is drawn, three of them being more closely related to our research agenda.  First, 
Arimura et al. (2007a) use a bivariate probit model to examine the link between the stringency 
of environmental policies and environmental R&D, in which the second dependent variable 
reflects whether or not a facility has put in place an environmental accounting system. They 
find that overall perceived stringency is associated with more environmental research, but find 
no specific influence for any of the individual policy instruments available (technology-based 
                                                 
3 Lanoie et al. (2005) also find positive results when they use a “lagged” regulation variable instead of a 
contemporaneous one.  
  6standards, performance-based standards, pollution taxes, etc.).  However, applying a different 
model, Johnstone and Labonne (2006) find some evidence for the role of environmentally 
related taxes in supporting investments in environmental R&D, while technology-based 
standards have a negative impact. Third, Darnall et al. (2007) also use a bivariate probit to 
investigate the relation between environmental performance and business performance.  They 
find that better environmental performance enhances business performance, but that 
stringency of the environmental policy regime still has a negative impact on business 
performance.   They use a bivariate probit model, transforming their dependent variable into 
binary form, which is different than the approach adopted here.   
 
 




The data was collected by means of a postal survey undertaken in seven OECD countries 
(Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Norway and the United States) at the facility 
level in early 2003 (see www.oecd.org/env/cpe/ﬁrms for a discussion of sampling procedure 
and survey protocol). The data covers facilities with more than 50 employees in all 
manufacturing sectors. The diversity in countries and sectors sampled implies a greater 
variation across policy frameworks, technological opportunities, and other factors which will 
allow for the generation of more reliable estimates of different potential determinants of 
environmental innovation and performance. 
 
Respondents were CEOs and environmental managers. Response rates range from ap-
proximately 9% to 35%, with a weighted mean of almost 25% (see Table 1). For a postal 
survey this is satisfactory, particularly since previous industrial surveys undertaken in the 
environmental sphere in many of the countries included in the survey have tended to have very 
low response rates. For instance, in a review of 183 studies based on business surveys 




Table 1: Response Rate by Country 







United States  12.1% 
Total 24.7% 
 
Table 2 provides data on the number of respondent facilities by industrial sector for the seven 
countries. While the sectoral data is available at the ISIC two digit level (24 sectors), the data 
is presented in somewhat aggregated form below. A comparison of the population of facilities 
at the two-digit level with our sample for ﬁve of the seven countries can be found at 
www.oecd.org/env/cpe/firms.  In the case of Norway, on the basis of a chi-square test, the 
sample is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the population of facilities in terms of size classes 
(50-99 employees; 100-249 employees; 250-499 employees; and, > 500 employees). In the 
case of Germany the distribution of the sample is statistically diﬀerent from that of the 
population by sector. Facility size data is not available for Germany. In the case of Japan, the 
sectoral distribution of the sample is representative, but not the size distribution. For France 
and Hungary, only ﬁrm-level data is available when using a cut-oﬀ of 50 employees.  
Table 2: Survey Respondents by Sector and by Country 
 ISIC 
Classification 
Canada France Germany Hungary  Japan  Norway  USA  Total 
Food Beverage and 
Tobacco 
Sectors 15-16 23  44  77  68  138  33 37  420 
Textiles, Apparel,  
Leather 
Sectors 17-19 8  13  40  50  72  10  12  205 
Wood Products  Sectors 20 & 36  32  12  26  27  32  49  34  212 
                                                 
4 While surveys undertaken as part of official data collection exercises may have higher response rates, in many 
such cases there are legal obligations to respond. Other studies also focus on large ﬁrms (e.g. Standard and Poor 
500), or ﬁrms with other attributes (i.e. listed on the stock exchange), which are likely to have higher response 
rates. Indeed, given the population sampled, the response rate was higher than had been anticipated. 
  8and Furniture 
Paper, Publishing 
& Printing 
Sectors 21-22 22  17  92  21  129  25 24  330 
Fuel, Chemicals,  
Rubber, Plastics 
Sectors 23-25 40  48  149  54  195  24  126  636 
Non-Metallic  
Mineral Products 
Sector 26  13  13  34  21  34  14  20  149 
Basic & 
Fab’d Metals 
Sectors 27-28 42  53  211  52  286  54  129  827 
Machinery 
And Instruments 
Sectors 29-33 50  47  227  119  439  55 59  996 
Motor Vehicles & 
Transp. Eqpmt 
Sectors 34-35 23  19  32  22  113  44 37  290 
Recycling and  
Other 
Sectors 37-39 3  2  10  29  29 1 5  79 
Total 
 
 256  268  898  463  1467  309  483  4144 
 
Signiﬁcantly, there are a large number of observations from smaller facilities for which 
response rates are usually much lower in such surveys. Indeed, in many previous studies small 
and medium sized enterprises are not sampled at all, a signiﬁcant shortcoming as regulators 
increasingly seek to inﬂuence the behaviour of smaller sources. In the sample, over 2500 fa-
cilities can be characterized as small or medium sized enterprises (< 250 employees).  
 
One concern with such a survey is that for strategic or other reasons respondents might be 
inclined to report relatively better environmental performance than is in fact the case.   
However, this is not a shortcoming which is particular to this study.  Indeed, self-reporting is 
typical when dealing with environmental performance data (e.g., TRI data are self reported). 
Reassuringly, there is considerable variation in the data, and a fair number of respondents have 
reported worsening environmental performance over the course of the study period (see 
below).  
 
It is difficult to corroborate the survey responses with other data sources since data of this kind 
is rarely collected, and when this is the case either the sample or the questions are very 
different.  However, in the case of Canada a comparison of responses to some of the questions 
with data obtained from a Statistics Canada study (Environmental Protection Expenditures in 
the Business Sector) can be found at (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/35/37265864.pdf). For 
instance, in the Statistics Canada study, 56% of facilities report having an EMS 
(Environmental Management System), while in the OECD sample the corresponding figure is 
54%. The proportion of facilities reporting ISO 14001 certification is almost identical in the 
two samples (19% and 18% respectively), mitigating fears of bias. 
 
  9Arimura et al. (2007a and 2007b) compare the R&D expenditure and environmental 
performance data with data collected from other sources. For the R&D data, the Japanese 
sample in the OECD survey was compared with data collected as part of the Survey of 
Research and Development 2002
5, which has been conducted in Japan for more than a decade.  
As in the OECD study, respondents were requested to provide information on the specific 
purposes of the research expenditures, including environmental conservation. Among 
4 312 facilities which replied to this question in the Japanese survey, 8.4% or 360 facilities 
had environment related research expenditure. In the OECD survey, the corresponding figure 
was 12%.  However, since the OECD survey only covers facilities with 50 employees or more 
and larger facilities are more likely to invest in environmental R&D, the difference between 
the two figures may be less than this would imply.   
 
For the environmental performance data, responses in the Japanese sample to a question posed 
on changes in the use of natural resources in the OECD survey were compared with reported 
changes in water use in the Japanese Census of Manufactures (Arimura et al. 2007b).  At the 
sectoral level the correlation is positive and significant. Similarly, Darnall (2007), reports a 
chi-square test comparing sector groupings (“dirty” or “clean” sectors)
6 with the reported 
stringency of their environmental policy regime.  The results showed that dirty sectors 
reported that the stringency of their environmental policy regime was greater than facilities 
operating in clean sectors (p<0.0001), therefore adding confidence to the accuracy of this very 
important independent variable.  
 
For the business performance variables, data on the change in production at the ISIC two-digit 
level was drawn from the OECD STAN database for Structural Analysis
7 and compared this 
with the data collected on the change in the value of shipments over the period 2000-2002.  
The correlation between the two variables is positive and significant in all cases, with 
correlation coefficients in excess of 0.6 for five of seven countries. The outliers are frequently 
those sectors for which the survey has a small number of observations.  
                                                 
5 Arimura et al. (2005) provide a basic review of the descriptive statistics of Japanese R&D Survey with focus on 
R&D activities for environmental purposes. 
6 This grouping relies on an existing taxonomy of U.S. manufacturing sectors (Mani and Wheeler, 1997; 
Gallagher and Ackerman, 2000).   
7 http://www.oecd.org/document/15/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1895503_1_1_1_1,00.html
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The model and the econometric strategy 
 
Following the representation of the Porter hypothesis depicted in Figure 1, the three “versions” 
will be tested by estimating the following three equations, using a two-stage estimation 
procedure with proper instruments: i) an Environmental R&D equation; ii) an Environmental 
performance equation, and iii) a Business performance equation.   
 
(1)  ENVIRONMENTAL R&D =  β0 +  β1 STRINGENCY1 + β2 STRINGENCY3 + β3 TECH-
STANDARDS1 + β4 TECH-STANDARDS2 + β5 TECH-STANDARDS3 + β6PERF-STANDARDS1 
+ β7 PERF-STANDARDS2 + β8 PERF-STANDARDS3 + β9TAX1 + β10TAX2 + β11TAX3 + Σ βi 
COUNTRYi + Σ βj SECTORj  + β28 AGE + β29 LOG (EMPLOYMENT) + β30 LOG (EMPLOYMENT)
2 
+ β31CONCENTRATION1 + β32CONCENTRATION2 + β33MULTI-FACILITY + β34FIRM INTL + 
β35 FIRM QUOTED +   β36 PRIMARY CUST + β37 MARKETSCOPE1 +  β38MARKETSCOPE2 + β39 
MARKETSCOPE3 + β40 INSTRUMENT R&D + εi                                                                             
 
(2)  ENVIRONMENTAL PERF. =  δ0 +   δ 1 STRINGENCY1 + δ2 STRINGENCY3 + δ3 TECH-
STANDARDS1 + δ4 TECH-STANDARDS2 + δ5 TECH-STANDARDS3 + δ6PERF-STANDARDS1 
+ δ7 PERF-STANDARDS2 + δ8 PERF-STANDARDS3 + δ9TAX1 + δ10TAX2 + δ11TAX3 + Σ δi 
COUNTRYi + Σ δ j SECTORj  + δ28 AGE + δ29 LOG (EMPLOYMENT) + δ30 LOG (EMPLOYMENT)
2  
+ δ31CONCENTRATION1 + δ32CONCENTRATION2 + δ33MULTI-FACILITY + δ34FIRM INTL + 
δ35 FIRM QUOTED +   δ36 PRIMARY CUST + δ37 MARKETSCOPE1 +   δ38MARKETSCOPE2 + δ39 
MARKETSCOPE3  +  δ40 INSTRUMENT ENV PERF + δ41FIT ENVIRONMENTAL R&D + ηi 
 
(3)  BUSINESS PERF. =  θ0 +   θ1 STRINGENCY1 + θ2 STRINGENCY3 +  
θ3TECH-STANDARDS1 + θ4 TECH-STANDARDS2 + θ5 TECH-STANDARDS3 + θ6PERF-
STANDARDS1 + θ7 PERF-STANDARDS2 + θ8 PERF-STANDARDS3 + θ9TAX1 + θ10TAX2 + 
θ11TAX3 + Σ θi COUNTRYi + Σ θ j SECTORj  + θ28 AGE + θ29LOG (EMPLOYMENT) + θ30 LOG 
(EMPLOYMENT)
2  + θ31CONCENTRATION1 + θ32CONCENTRATION2 + θ33MULTI-FACILITY 
+  θ34FIRM INTL + θ35  FIRM QUOTED +   θ36  PRIMARY CUST + θ37  MARKETSCOPE1 +   
θ38MARKETSCOPE2 + θ39 MARKETSCOPE3 + θ40FIT  
ENVIRONMENTAL R&D + θ41FIT ENVIRONMENTAL PERF +  λi  
 
  11where the βk, δk and θk are parameters to be estimated, and εi, ηi and  λi are error terms: 
εi~ N(0, σ
2), ηi ~ N(0, 1). and  λi  ~ N(0, 1)
8.  
 
Dependent variables  
 
Table 3 provides the definition and descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the 
analysis.  The three dependent variables are defined as follows.  ENVIRONMENTAL R&D 
is a 0,1 variable which takes the value 1 when the respondent answered “Yes” to the following 
question: Does your facility have a budget for research and development specifically related 
to environmental matters ?, and 0 otherwise.   
 
To construct the ENVIRONMENT PERF variable, we combine the answers to the two 
following questions for five different impact areas (i.e. use of natural resources, solid waste, 
wastewater, local and regional air pollutants, and global air pollutants)  
 
A) How important do you consider each of the following potential negative 
environmental impacts from your facility’s products and production processes? (no 
negative impact, moderately negative impact, very negative impact, not applicable) 
 
B) Has your facility experienced a change in the environmental impacts per unit of 
output of its products or production processes in the last three years with respect to 
the following? (significant increase, increase, no change, decrease, significant decrease, 
not applicable)   
 
Observations from respondents who indicated that the impact area is 'not applicable' are 
treated as missing. 
 
For each type of environmental impact, we multiply the perceived “importance” of the 
problem (scaled from 1 to 3) and the perceived “change” (scaled from 1 to 5) that occurred in 
the last three years.  These values are then summed across the five impact areas, to give a 
                                                 
8   : ηi and  λi are, formally, the error terms of the model involving the unobserved latent variables. 
  12potential maximum of 75 and minimum of 15. The following figure provides the distribution 
the ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE variable on a scale



























Previous authors who have used this database (Johnstone et al, 2007b, Darnall et al., 2007) 
have constructed a binary variable taking the value 1 when a facility reports that there has 
been a “significantly decrease” or “decrease” with respect to a specific environmental impact, 
and 0 otherwise.  As such, information with respect to the perceived potential “importance” of 
the impact arising out of the facility’s specific production activities has not been applied.  We 
consider our measure of environmental performance to be richer.          
 
For the BUSINESS PERF variable, we use the answer, on a five-point scale, to the following 
question:   
 
                                                 
9 The scale could be below 15 for facilities which reported that one or more impact areas was “not applicable”. 
  13How would you assess your facility’s overall business performance over the last three 
years?  (revenue has been so low as to produce large losses, revenue has been 
insufficient to cover costs, revenue has allowed us to break even, revenue has been 
sufficient to make a small profit, revenue has been well in excess of costs) 
 
Given the nature of these three dependent variables, equation (1) is estimated using a Probit 
model, equation (2) with an OLS, and equation (3) with an Ordered Probit.  In addition, for the 
ENVIRONMENTAL R&D equation we use an instrument because of suspected simultaneity 
between ENVIRONMENTAL R&D and BUSINESS PERF (as well as between 
ENVIRONMENTAL R&D and ENVIRONMENT PERF). Specifically, the decision to invest 
in environmental R&D may be influenced by unobserved factors which also affect business 
performance (and environmental performance). Such factors might include the personal 
preferences of the manager (or the CEO), the structure of the firm, the links between the R&D 
department and the decision makers in the firm, etc. If the potential simultaneity between the 
two variables is not addressed, we would obtain biased estimates.  
 
As such, it is necessary to identify an instrument correlated with the decision to invest in 
environmental R&D, but which is not directly correlated with business performance (and 
environmental performance). We use the average percentage of facilities in the same sector 
and same country with a specific environmental R&D budget as the instrument 
(INSTRUMENT R&D). This is assumed to be correlated with the decision to undertake 
environmental R&D in the specific facility, but to have an insignificant impact on the 
facility’s business performance.  This type of instrument is common in the industrial 
organization literature
10 where, for instance, the average price of a product on markets 
different than that under consideration (i.e. neighbouring states) is widely used. 
 
When we estimate the ENVIRONMENT PERF EQUATION, we use an instrument defined as 
the average environmental performance of the facilities in the same sector in the same country 
(INSTRUMENT ENV PERF).  In this equation, FIT  ENVIRONMENTAL R&D is the fitted 
value of the preceding equation. In the BUSINESS PERF equation, the variable FIT 
                                                 
10 See Hausman et al. (1994), Hausman (1996), Nevo (2000 a, b). 
  14ENVIRONMENTAL PERF is the fitted value of the preceding equation
11, and the variable 





Environmental R&D Equation 
 
Regarding the environmental policy variables, we note first that the STRINGENCY indicators 
are obtained from responses to the following question: 
 
How would you describe the environmental policy regime to which your facility is 
subject? 
- Not particularly stringent, obligations can be met with relative ease 
- Moderate stringency, require some managerial and technological responses 
- Very stringent, has a great deal of influence on decision-making in the facility 
 
Given that it might be considered arbitrary to apply a continuous variable with the scale 1, 2, 
and 3, and that perceived stringency could vary in a non-linear fashion, we constructed two 
dummy variables STRINGENCY1, which is equal to 1 if the answer is 1, and 0 otherwise; and 
STRINGENCY3, which is equal to 1 when the answer is 3, and 0 otherwise (STRINGENCY2 
is the reference case).  According to PH, the sign of the estimated coefficient of 
STRINGENCY3 should be positive.  It is expected that STRINGENCY1 will have a negative 
impact.    
 
For four different types of environmental policy instrument (technology-based standard, 
performance-based standard, input tax, emission or effluent charge) respondents were 
requested to:  
 
                                                 
11 PH does not necessarily imply that the environmental performance influences business performance, so the 
business performance equation was also estimated without the variable ENVIRONMENTAL PERF.  
  15Please assess the following environmental policy instruments in terms of their impacts 
on your facility’s production activities. (not important, moderately important, very 
important, not applicable).  
 
In this case, “not applicable” is taken as the reference case. TECH-STANDARDS1 is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 when the answer for the item “technology-based standards” are 
considered not important, and zero otherwise, and so on for the other two TECH-
STANDARDS variables and for the PERF-STANDARDS variables. The variables TAX1, 
TAX2 and TAX3 are similar, but they combine the two items “input taxes”, and “emission or 
effluent taxes or charges”
12.  Again, with regards to the “weak version” of the PH, all these 
variables are expected to have a positive influence on the probability to have a specific R&D 
budget allocated to environmental matters.  In line with the “narrow” version, we expect the 
more flexible tax policies to have a stronger impact than the regulatory measures (technology-
based and performance-based standards).   
 
Concerning the control variables, we first introduce COUNTRY and SECTOR dichotomous 
variables to capture unobservable specific influences related to the country or the sector of 
activity.  The AGE of the facility is included, and its expected sign is ambiguous.  On the one 
hand, older facilities may use older technologies, and therefore have a greater need for 
research and development on environmental matters.  On the other hand, older facilities may 
face less stringent regulations than new ones, and have lower incentives to do environmental 
R&D.  We use the EMPLOYMENT level as a proxy for the size of the facility.  In the 
Schumpeterian view, it is expected that larger facilities are more likely to do research, but that 
this relation may be non-linear (EMPLOYMENT
2) (see Jaumotte and Pain 2005 for a review.) 
As in many other papers, we use these measures in log form.  Standard theory has ambiguous 
predictions concerning the impact of market concentration on innovation 
(CONCENTRATION1 and CONCENTRATION2)
13.  The Schumpeterian view predicts that 
                                                 
12 Other policy instruments were also listed in this question like subsidies or voluntary agreements. However, 
given that, in policy discussions, the focus is often put on the “command-and-control” versus “economic 
instruments” debate, and in order to avoid multicollinearity problems, we kept only the items mentioned above.  
 
13 The CONCENTRATION variables are obtained from responses to the following question: With how many 
other firms did your facility compete on the market for its most commercially important product within the past 
three years? (Please tick only one box). 1. Less than 5 ; 2. 5-10 ; 3. Greater than 10. 
  16facilities in more concentrated industries are more likely to invest in research since they can 
enjoy the monopoly rents from any innovations identified as a consequence of the R&D. In 
contrast, in the Arrovian view, firms which enjoy market power tend “to rest on their laurels” 
(e.g., Tirole, 1989), which leads to the opposite prediction. 
 
We also include three variables to capture important characteristics of the firm to which the 
facility belongs.  First, the variable MULTI-FACILITY reflects whether the facility belongs to 
a multi-facility enterprise.  It is expected that facilities in multi-facility firms are more likely to 
invest in research on environmental matters because of the potential spillovers across plants.  
Second, a variable reflects if the firm’s head office is located in a foreign country (FIRM 
INTL), in order to test whether or not multinational firms are more likely to be concerned with 
environmental issues, and to take concrete actions, such as devoting a specific budget to R&D.  
Third, FIRM QUOTED reflects whether or not a facility belongs to a company quoted on the 
stock market.  It is expected that firms on the stock exchange are more likely to signal their 
concern for environmental matters to potential investors.  In addition, due to the difficulties 
frequently encountered in financing R&D, a stock market listing may ease some of the 
constraints.  
 
Finally, we include variables to reflect the characteristics of the facility’s market.  The first 
one, PRIMARY CUST is equal to 1 when the primary customers of the facility’s products are 
“households” or “wholesalers or retailers”, and 0 otherwise.  In the same vein as with the 
preceding variable, it is expected that facilities who deal directly with customers or retailers 
may have greater incentive to signal their actions related to environmental issues.   We also 
have three variables to capture the spatial scope of the market in which they operate 
(MARKETSCOPE1, MARKETSCOPE2, MARKETSCOPE3)
14.  It is expected that facilities 
with a more global market scope are more likely to have a specific environmental R&D 
budget. 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
CONCENTRATION1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the answer is 1 and 0 otherwise; CONCENTRATION2 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the answer is 2 and 0 otherwise.    
14 The MARKETSCOPE variables are obtained from responses to the question: What best characterises the 
scope of your facility’s market? (Please tick only one box) 1.Local ; 2. National ; 3.Regional (neighbouring 
countries) ; 4. Global. MARKETSCOPE2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the answer is 2 and 0 
otherwise;MARKETSCOPE3 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the answer is 3 and 0 otherwise, etc. 
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In this equation, we have the same independent variables, except for the instrument, and for 
the FIT ENVIRONMENTAL R&D variable, which is the fitted value of the preceding 
equation. This variable is expected to positively influence environmental performance.   
Regarding the expected signs of the other independent variables, we postulate that the same 
arguments prevailing in the preceding equation are relevant, i.e., variables influencing 
positively the probability to have a specific environmental R&D budget are likely to influence 
positively the environmental performance.  Regarding the environmental policy variables, 
economic analysis does not provide insights as to whether ‘direct’ regulations or ‘market-
based’ instruments are more likely to induce increased efforts to improve environmental 
performance at the level of the individual facility. In the face of facility heterogeneity, there 
are nevertheless good reasons to expect that variation in environmental performance will be 
greater under market-based instruments than under direct regulations. Indeed, the case for 
introducing market-based instruments is typically made on the basis of the cost-savings which 
arise out of the efficient allocation of efforts across heterogeneous facilities, not with respect 




Business Performance Equation 
 
Here also, the same independent variables as in the preceding equation are used, except that 
we add the variable FIT ENVIRONMENTAL PERF.  In line with Porter’s argument and with 
results obtained in previous studies (e.g. Darnall et al., 2007), the coefficient of this variable 
should be positive, as well as the coefficient of the FIT ENVIRONMENTAL R&D variable.  
The arguments concerning the expected signs for the other independent variables are fairly 
intuitive.  In the next section, they will be discussed in details for the variables that turn out to 
be significant.  
 
                                                 
15 However, there is good reason to believe that ‘cap-and-trade’ permit systems will be more environmentally 
effective at the economy-wide level than other measures of equal stringency. See Johnstone (2005). 
  18Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the main variables 
Variable Description  Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
Environmental 
R&D 
Does facility have environmental R&D budget? (0=no; 1=yes)  0.093  0.290  0  1 
Environmental 
Perf. 
Index of environmental performance (scale= 15 to 75, see footnote 90)  33.022  10.562  11  72 
Business Perf.  Assessment of overall business performance (1=revenue has been so low as to 
produce large losses; 2=revenue has been insufficient to cover costs; 
3=revenue has allowed us to break even; 4=revenue has been sufficient to 
make a small profit; 5=revenue has been well in excess of costs) 
3.460 0.989  1 5 
Stingency1  The environmental policy regime is not particularly stringent, obligations can 
be met with relative ease (0=no, 1=yes) 
0.360 0.480  0 1 
Stringency3  The environmental policy regime is very stringent, it has a great deal of 
influence on decision-making in the facility  (0=no, 1=yes) 
0.159 0.366  0 1 
Tech-standards1  The technology-based standards are not important (0=no, 1=yes)  0.157  0.364  0  1 
Tech-standards2  The technology-based standards are moderately important (0=no, 1=yes)  0.355  0.478  0  1 
Tech-standards3  The technology-based standards are very important (0=no, 1=yes)  0.207  0.405  0  1 
Perf-standards1  The performance-based standards are not important (0=no, 1=yes)  0.112  0.315  0  1 
Perf-standards2  The performance-based standards are moderately important (0=no, 1=yes)  0.387  0.487  0  1 
Perf-standards3  The performance-based standards are very important (0=no, 1=yes)  0.308  0.462  0  1 
Tax1  The environmental taxes are not important (0=no, 1=yes)  0.233  0.423  0  1 
Tax2  The environmental taxes are moderately important (0=no, 1=yes)  0.475  0.499  0  1 
Tax3  The environmental taxes are  very important (0=no, 1=yes)  0.311  0.463  0  1 
USA  Dummy for the country (omitted = Canada)  0.117  0.321  0  1 
Germany    "  0.215 0.411  0 1 
Hungary   "  0.111 0.315  0 1 
Japan "  0.358 0.479  0 1 
France "  0.064 0.245  0 1 
Norway "  0.074 0.262  0 1 
Food   Dummy for the sector (omitted = recycling)  0.100  0.300  0  1 
Leather "  0.049 0.216  0 1 
Wood "  0.051 0.219  0 1 
Pulp   "  0.079 0.270  0 1 
Coke "  0.152 0.359  0 1 
Nonmetal "  0.036 0.185  0 1 
Metal   "  0.198 0.398  0 1 
Machinery "  0.238 0.426  0 1 
Motor "  0.069 0.254  0 1 
Age  Age of the facility  36.135  21.582  0  99 
Log (employment)  # of full time employees in facility (log)  5.106  1.047  0.6931 10.2617
Log (employment)
2 Squared # of full time employees in facility (log)  27.169  11.481  0.4804105.3044
Concentration1  Number of competitors (less than 5 or not)  0.264  0.441  0  1 
  19Concentration2  Number of competitors (between 5 and 10 or not)  0.344  0.475  0  1 
Multi-facility  Does the facility belong to a multi-facility enterprise (0=no, 1=yes)  0.520  0.500  0  1 
Firm intl  Head office located in foreign country? (0=no; 1=yes)  0.120  0.325  0  1 
Firm quoted  Listed on a stock exchange? (0=no; 1=yes)  0.167  0.373  0  1 
Primary  cust  Primary customers of the facility’s products (1=“Households” or 
“Wholesalers or retailers”, 0 otherwise) 
0.373 0.484  0 1 
Marketscope1  Scope of facility’s market (local or not)  0.409  0.492  0  1 
Marketscope2  Scope of facility’s market (national or not)  0.409  0.492  0  1 
Markescope3  Scope of facility’s market (regional or not)  0.108  0.310  0  1 
 
5. Empirical results  
 
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients in our three main equations.  Panel A presents the 
results of the Environmental R&D equation, Panel B the Environmental Performance 
equation, and Panel C the Business Performance equation.  In each Panel, Column 1 refers to 
the model as presented in equations (1), (2) and (3).  In order to have a sense of the robustness 
of our results, we also provide three alternative approaches.  In each case, we define one of the 
three dependent variables in an alternative manner.  In column (2) of each panel, we repeat the 
same exercise, but with total R&D expenditures as a measure of innovation generated by more 
rigorous environmental regulation
16.  Indeed, Porter suggests that the stringency of 
environmental policies should lead to more innovation, but he does not mention specifically 
the effect on environmental R&D.  Jaffe and Palmer (1997) use total R&D in their evaluation 
of the PH.  In column (3) of each panel, we repeat the exercise using a “0,1” measure of 
environmental performance, as discussed above and suggested by Darnall et al. (2007) and 
Johnstone et al. (2007b).  Finally, in column (4) of each panel, we use the evolution of 
shipments instead of profits as a measure of business performance.  In this case, the 
environmental R&D and environmental performance equations are not affected.   
 
Column (1) remains our “preferred” specification: environmental R&D is more likely to be 
affected by environmental policies than total R&D; our measure of environmental 
performance is more precise and complete than a “0,1” measure; and, profits is better 
                                                 
16 Since we refer to total R&D expenditures, an OLS model is used.  As 533 facilities reported no R&D 
expenditures, the dependent variable is truncated and we also estimated the model with a Tobit. The results 
(available upon request) were very similar to those reported in Table 4. 
  20approximation of business performance than sales.  We will thus start our discussion by 
focusing on column (1).     




Main Regression (1) 
Coeff.    P. Value 
Total R&D (2) 
Coeff.        P.Value 
Env. Perf. Binary (3) 
Coeff.      P. Value 
Shipments (4) 
Coeff.      P. Value
Stringency1  -.259839     0.001  -1.57e+08   0.638  -.259839     0.001  -.259839     0.001 
Stringency3  .2473861    0.006  -4.62e+08   0.295  .2473861    0.006  .2473861    0.006 
Tech-standards1  .0348849    0.752  1.23e+08   0.808  .0348849    0.752  .0348849    0.752 
Tech-standards2  -.082071  0.409  2.85e+08   0.533  -.082071  0.409  -.082071  0.409 
Tech-standards3  .0592128    0.619  8.96e+08   0.104  .0592128    0.619  .0592128    0.619 
Perf-standards1  .1505738    0.303  1.63e+08   0.787  .1505738    0.303  .1505738    0.303 
Perf-standards2  .2217971     0.042  7475385   40.987  .2217971     0.042  .2217971     0.042 
Perf-standards3  .228787    0.057  -1.19e+08   50.826  .228787    0.057  .228787    0.057 
Tax1  -.062489    0.476  -1.27e+08      0.739  -.062489    0.476  -.062489    0.476 
Tax2  -.024468    0.742  -1.98e+08   0.547  -.024468    0.742  -.024468    0.742 
Tax3  .0228959     0.790  2.08e+08   0.595  .0228959     0.790  .0228959     0.790 
Age  .0027938       0.077  -4866450    0.483  .0027938       0.077  .0027938       0.077
Log (employment)  -.2385036    0.205  -1.20e+10   0.000  -.2385036    0.205  -.2385036    0.205 
Log (employment)
2  .0409231    0.014  1.21e+10   0.000  .0409231    0.014  .0409231    0.014 
Concentration1  .176392    0.031  -4.94e+08   0.176  .176392    0.031  .176392    0.031 
Concentration2  .19748     0.009  -4.72e+08   0.152  .19748     0.009  .19748     0.009 
Multi-facility  .0572784    0.402  -3.67e+08   0.220  .0572784    0.402  .0572784    0.402 
Firm intl  -.0642464   0.537  -1.68e+08   0.744  -.0642464   0.537  -.0642464   0.537 
Firm quoted  .0942427    0.283  4.41e+08   0.336  .0942427    0.283  .0942427    0.283 
Primary cust  .0107136    0.884  5.53e+08   0.084  .0107136    0.884  .0107136    0.884 
Marketscope1  -.149377   0.270  -7.32e+08      0.214  -.149377   0.270  -.149377   0.270 
Marketscope2  -.1979465     0.014  -4.91e+08   0.178  -.1979465     0.014  -.1979465     0.014
Marketscope3  -.0227915   0.848  1.20e+07   0.981  -.0227915   0.848  -.0227915   0.848 
Instrument R&D  4.525124    0.000  9244826   0.000  4.525124    0.000  4.525124    0.000 
R-squared  0.1146 0.1142 0.1146  0.1146 
Observations  3617 2503 3617  3617 
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Dependent variable:  Main Regression (1)  Total R&D (2)  Env. Perf. Binary (3)  Shipments (4) 
Environmental Perf.  Coeff.    P. Value  Coeff.        P.Value  Coeff.      P. Value  Coeff.      P. Value
Stringency1  -2.564552   . 0.000  -2.726697     0.000  (dropped)  -2.564552   . 0.000
Stringency3  1.580575   0.048  1.495629    0.037  .0117417    0.654  1.580575   0.048 
Tech-standards1  1.856611    0.033  1.93378   0.027  .0526249   0.054  1.856611    0.033 
Tech-standards2  2.38655     0.002  2.545244   0.001  .0753608    0.002  2.38655     0.002 
Tech-standards3  1.712167    0.068  2.219477   0.031  .0365303   0.212  1.712167    0.068 
Perf-standards1  .1369385    0.908  .2480075   0.832  .0918775   0.006  .1369385    0.908 
Perf-standards2  2.55761    0.008  2.559745    0.005  .1400523   0.000  2.55761    0.008 
Perf-standards3  3.940165    0.000  3.870746   0.000  .1667656     0.048  3.940165    0.000 
Tax1  -.4085853    0.546  -.4945114   0.461  -.0120941   0.556  -.4085853    0.546 
Tax2  -.0968455    0.863  -.2249481   0.694  .0333386   0.054  -.0968455    0.863 
Tax3  .302084    0.045  1.43534   0.029  .038269   0.060  .302084    0.045 
Age  .0047289    0.708  .0039917   0.743  .0002143   0.586  .0047289    0.708 
Log (employment)  -.8552694   0.591  -7.831466   0.174  .0359367   0.467  -.8552694   0.591 
Log (employment)2  .2438749   0.108  .9556885   0.097  .0020351   0.677  .2438749   0.108 
Concentration1  -.0777854    0.909  -.3236137    0.621  .0004312   0.984  -.0777854    0.909 
Concentration2  .9140179    0.158  .6626426   0.273  .0100868   0.619  .9140179    0.158 
Multi-facility  1.042265    0.050  .8177985   0.139  -.0093245   0.562  1.042265    0.050 
Firm intl  1.29889    0.091  1.150229   0.134  .0105952    0.672  1.29889    0.091 
Firm quoted  -.3747591    0.578  -.1538385   0.822  .0081486    0.726  -.3747591    0.578 
Primary cust  -1.011436    0.067  -.7422391   0.220  -.0232598   0.169  -1.011436    0.067 
Marketscope1  .0105878   0.992  .9556885   0.097  -.0641135   0.043  .0105878   0.992 
Marketscope2  -.8687797    0.216  -1.22517   0.065  -.0268562   0.214  -.8687797    0.216 
Marketscope3  1.043586    0.212  1.122838   0.179  .0127429    0.628  1.043586    0.212 
Instrument Env. Perf.  .3820423    0.000  2356673   0.001  .0063639   0.013  .3820423    0.000 
Fit Env. R&D  .3003784    0.850  -5.78e-10   0.209  .0139169   0.788  .3003784    0.850 
R-squared  0.2159            0.2099  0.0990  0.2159 
Observations  1656 1656 3681  1656 
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Dependent variable:  Main Regression (1)  Total R&D (2)  Env. Perf. Binary (3)  Shipments (4) 
Business Perf.  Coeff.    P. Value  Coeff.        P.Value  Coeff.      P. Value  Coeff.      P. Value 
Stringency1  .0869374    0.219  .0561415    0.459  .0868955   0.223  4.99e+09   0.389 
Stringency3  -.1406783    0.051  -.0778881   0.257  -.1412988    0.036  -8.86e+09   0.156 
Tech-standards1  .0632713    0.392  .0505136   0.528  .0641942   0.451  -1.93e+10   0.006 
Tech-standards2  .0293627     0.687  -.0203893   0.808  .0308771   0.750  -1.42e+10   0.008 
Tech-standards3  .0299407    0.700  -.0095498    0.919  .0302814   0.708  (dropped) 
Perf-standards1  -.1146602    0.167  -.0907908   0.263  -.1108494   0.367  7.81e+09   0.391 
Perf-standards2  -.0843931    0.296  -.0549574   0.519  -.0802483   0.607  3.87e+09   0.498 
Perf-standards3  -.1112005    0.279  -.083422   0.459  -.1068991   0.564  (dropped) 
Tax1  .0780998    0.130  .0735657   0.156  0778749   0.13  5.30e+07   0.992 
Tax2  0303942    0.481  .0368194   0.403  .0318808   0.556  1.37e+09   0.777 
Tax3  -.0878812    0.113  -.1025273   0.093  -.0871761      0.173  4.19e+09   0.442 
Age  -.0043678    0.000  -.0036149    0.000  -.0043621   0.000  -6.23e+07   0.478 
Log (employment)  -.0176274    0.888  .4926506   0.314  -.0154929      0.904  -2.20e+11   0.000 
Log (employment)
2  .0053395    0.682  -.0435979    0.390  .0052533    0.676  2.15e+10   0.000 
Concentration1  .1797393    0.001  .2415721   0.000  .1798128   0.001  -9.78e+09   0.049 
Concentration2  .0564358   0.291  .1169826     0.017  .0562173   0.280  -7.46e+09   0.087 
Multi-facility  .0309915    0.474  .0524174    0.239  .0298564   0.467  -6.83e+09   0.125 
Firm intl  .0794885    0.235  .0672878   0.323  -.0871761      0.17  -4.72e+08   0.939 
Firm quoted  .0807965    0.172  0937432   0.179  .0814086   0.168  2.87e+09   0.605 
Primary cust  .0579448    0.207  .0454107   0.353  .0576722   0.237  1.26e+10   0.006 
Marketscope1  .0579448    0.207  -.0832841   0.309  -.090643    0.370  -1.17e+10   0.188 
Marketscope2  .0730595    0.194  .0606414   0.296  . 0725328   0.231  -3.05e+09   0.524 
Marketscope3  -.0535669     0.433  -.0671934   0.342  -.0537643   0.425  -7.94e+08   0.907 
Fit Env. Perf.  -.0007085    0.966  .006842   . 0.758  -.0425329   0.966  1.06e+09   0.500 
Fit R&D  .2259759     0.089  4.68e-11   0.230  .2256452   . 0.088  1.08e+09   0.855 
(pseudo) R-squared      0.0506 0.0504 0.0506  0.0508 
Observations  1656 3574 3574  1767 
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Environmental R&D Equation 
 
In our first equation, the dependent variable is a binary variable indicating the existence 
or not of a specific R&D budget for environmental matters in the facility.  It is estimated 
using a Probit, with an instrument defined as the average percentage of facilities in the 
same sector and same country with a specific environmental R&D budget.  This variable, 
INSTRUMENT R&D, has a positive and strongly significant coefficient. 
 
Regarding the environmental policy variables, we first find that perceived policy 
stringency plays a significant role.  If the environmental policy regime is perceived as 
“very stringent” (STRINGENCY3), this has a positive and significant impact on the 
probability of having a specific R&D budget devoted to environmental issues.   
Analogously, when the regime is perceived as being “not particularly stringent” 
(STRINGENCY1), it has a negative impact on the probability to have a specific 
environmental R&D budget.  Policy instrument choice also matters. When performance-
based standards are perceived as “moderately important” or “very important” (PERF-
STANDARDS2 and PERF-STANDARDS3), this has a positive and significant impact 
on the probability of having a specific R&D budget for pollution control.  None of the 
other policy variables has a significant coefficient.   
 
These results provide support for the “weak” version of PH, but not for the “narrow” one, 
since flexible instruments like pollution taxes are not those with the strongest impact on 
environmental innovation.  This may be simply due to the fact that these instruments are 
not very widespread (Johnstone et al., 2007, and OECD, 2006), and that, when they are 
used, they are not very stringent (OECD, 2006).  However, the finding that performance 
standards have an impact, but not technology-based standards, is reassuring.  Indeed, 
when technology-based standards are used, the pollution control technology to be 
adopted by facilities is prescribed so that, not surprisingly, they are not induced to 
identify other options through investment in R&D.  With performance standards, 
facilities have more flexibility to choose how they will meet standards and thus the 
returns on research are potentially greater.   Actually, our results suggest that more 
  25“flexible” regulations (performance standards) have more impact on environmental 
innovation than more prescriptive measures (technology-based standards), which is in 
line with Porter’s narrow version.      
 
Among the control variables, it is noteworthy that Japanese facilities are significantly 
more likely to have a specific R&D budget for environmental matters than the reference 
country (Canada).  The facilities whose market scope is regional (MARKETSCOPE3) 
have a lower probability to have a specific R&D budget for environmental matters than 
the reference case (local markets).  This suggests that facilities which put the emphasis on 
their local market may have a greater incentive to signal their willingness to improve 
their environmental performance.  Furthermore, facilities in more concentrated markets 
(CONCENTRATION1, CONCENTRATION2) have a higher probability to invest in 
research on environmental issues.   This contrasts with the result in Brunnermeir and 
Cohen (2003) who find that environmental R&D is more important in more competitive 
industries.  However, we find no effect of facility size on the probability to have a 
specific environmental R&D budget.            
 
Our results are comparable with those of Jaffe and Palmer (1997) who find a significant 
impact of environmental regulation on R&D expenditures, but no effect on patents. 
Arimura et al. (2007b) have also used this database to assess whether more stringent 
environmental policy regimes are associated with greater environmental innovation.   
They find, as in this paper, that the perceived stringency of the environmental policy 
regime plays a positive and significant role, but that none of the other policy variables is 
significant.  However, their econometric approach is different than ours
17.   
 
Environmental Performance Equation 
 
In this case, the number of observations is reduced to 1656, primarily because there are a 
large number of missing observations for the environmental performance question 
                                                 
17 As we have seen, they use a bivariate probit model in which the other dependent variable is 
« environmental accounting », reflecting whether or not a facility has put in place an environmental 
accounting system. 
  26relating to “global pollutants”.  Given the continuous nature of the ENVIRONMENTAL 
PERF variable (described above), an OLS model is applied.  In this equation, an 
instrument is used, INTRUMENT ENV PERF, which is the average environmental 
performance of the facilities in the same sector in the same country.  It has a positive 
coefficient, as expected, and it is highly significant.  Furthermore, the variable FIT 
ENVIRONMENTAL R&D is the fitted value of the preceding equation that was 
estimated with a similar instrument as that just mentioned.  The coefficient of this fitted 
variable has a positive sign, as expected, but is not significant.   
 
Regarding the environmental policy variables, most are positive and significant, 
suggesting, as expected, that more stringent policies improve environmental performance.  
Generally speaking, this is consistent with previous literature on the effectiveness of 
environmental policy in reducing pollution (Magat and Viscusi, 1990; Gray and Deily, 
1996; Laplante and Rilstone, 1996; Lanoie et al., 1998; Lanoie et al., 2002). 
 
Three results are particularly noteworthy.  First, the perceived stringency of the 
performance standards has a more important impact than that of the technology-based 
standards as suggested by theory
18.  As far as we know, this is a new result in the 
literature since previous researchers did not have access to information detailed enough to 
investigate this question.  
 
Second, when the environmental policy regime is perceived as “very stringent” 
(STRINGENCY3), this has a positive and significant impact on environmental 
performance.  Analogously, when the regime is perceived as “not particularly stringent” 
(STRINGENCY1), it has a negative and significant impact on environmental 
performance. 
 
Third, environmental taxes have a significant impact only when they are perceived as 
being very important (TAX3).  This suggests that taxes provide incentives to reduce 
                                                 
18 A Wald test (F3, 1614) = 2.12 shows that we can reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of the 
performance standards are equal to those of the technology standards at the 10 % confidence level. 
  27pollution only when they are high enough, which is not very common in OECD countries 
(OECD, 2006).  Again, there are few comparable results in the literature given constraints 
on data availability. 
 
Among the control variables, the dummy variable for Hungarian facilities is negative and 
significant, indicating they are less likely to report improvements in environmental 
performance than the reference country (Canada). For France and the U.S., the variable is 
positive and significant.  The sector dummy variables are all negative relative to the 
reference sector (Recycling and other).  The SIZE, the AGE, the market SCOPE and the 
market CONCENTRATION variables do not have a significant impact.   
 
Interestingly, the fact that primary customers are primarily households and/or retailers 
(PRIMARY CUST.), as opposed to other manufacturing firms, or other manufacturing 
units within the same firm, has a negative impact on reported environmental 
performance.  This may suggest that the environmental performance is becoming more 
important in business-to-business (B2B) trading.  For instance, facilities with ISO14001 
are required to check the environmental performance of their suppliers.  Finally, the 
finding that a facility belongs to a MULTI-FACILITY firm is associated with improved 
environmental performance suggests that there could be beneficial transfers of 
technology or expertise across facilities.       
  
Estimates of environmental performance are included in two other papers of the OECD 
project (Johnstone et al., 2007b, Darnall et al., 2007).  It is very difficult to compare our 
results with those of Johnstone et al. (2007b) since they estimate distinct equations for 
three types of pollutants (water, air, waste).  Darnall et al. (2007) also find that regulatory 
influences have a positive impact on the overall environmental performance of facilities.  
However, they use an aggregate measure of the stringency of environmental policy 
regimes (issued from a factor analysis), and not individual measures as we do.   
Furthermore, they find that facilities with an environmental R&D budget have better 
environmental performance but, contrary to us, they do not instrument this variable.     
 
  28Business Performance Equation 
 
Given the nature of the dependent variable the BUSINESS PERFORMANCE equation is 
estimated with an Ordered Probit model (1656 observations).  The variable FIT 
ENVIRONMENTAL PERF is the fitted value of the preceding equation that was 
estimated with a proper instrument
19.  The variable FIT ENVIRONMENTAL R&D is 
also the fitted value of the ENVIRONMENTAL R&D equation. This variable is positive 
and significant (at the 10 % level).  With respect to our hypothesised chain of causality, 
this implies that the stringency of the environmental policy regime (STRINGENCY3) 
influences ENVIRONMENTAL R&D positively, which, in turn, has a positive effect on 
business performance.  When we multiply the two relevant coefficients, we obtain the 
indirect positive impact of STRINGENCY 3 on business performance (≈ +0,05).  To our 
knowledge, this is the first time that these channels of influence suggested by Porter are 
detected empirically. 
 
However, the direct effect of STRINGENCY 3 on business performance is negative, and 
the size of this effect is larger in absolute value than the positive indirect effect described 
above (-0,14).  In terms of the PH, one can say that “innovation only partially offset the 
costs of complying with environmental policies”.  This may mean, for instance, that a 
large part of the investments necessary to comply with regulation represent additional 
production costs, such as through investment in end-of-pipe abatement. While some of 
these costs may be offset by the efficiency gains identified through investment in R&D, 
the net effect remains negative. This intuition is indirectly confirmed by Frondel et al. 
(2007) who find that the decision to invest in end-of-pipe technologies is linked to the 
stringency of environmental policies, while the decision to invest in integrated clean 
production is rather influenced by “cost savings” motivations
20.  No other environmental 
policy variable is significant, nor is the FIT ENVIRONMENTAL PERF variable.     
 
                                                 
19 PH does not necessarily imply that the environmental performance influences business performance,   
and the nature of the results was not altered without the variable FIT ENVIRONMENTAL PERF. 
20 One of the questions in the questionnaire was: «How important do you consider the following 
motivations to have been with respect to the environmental practices of your facility ?” Cost savings was 
one of the potential items to be evaluated by the respondents.  
  29Among the control variables, we find that American, Norwegian, German, Japanese and 
French facilities in the sample have a lower reported business performance than those of 
the reference country, Canada. The facility’s AGE has a negative influence on business 
performance, which may suggest that older facilities have older and less productive 
technologies.  Finally, as expected, strong market concentration (CONCENTRATION1) 
has a positive effect on business performance.  
 
Darnall et al. (2007) also estimate a BUSINESS PERFORMANCE equation with this 
database using, as we saw earlier, a bivariate probit in which ENVIRONMENTAL 
PERFORMANCE is the second dependent variable.  They find that the 
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE has a positive impact on BUSINESS 
PERFORMANCE, although the STRINGENCY of environmental policy is found, as in 
our analysis, to have a negative impact on BUSINESS PERFORMANCE.  The link 
between ENVIRONMENTAL R&D and BUSINESS PERFORMANCE is not 
investigated. 
 
Other researchers have examined the link between environmental performance and 
business performance with a simpler approach than that developed here, paying less 
attention to the role of environmental policy and environmental R&D, and making no 
attempt to deal with endogeneity issues (Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Russo and Fouts, 1997; 
Konar and Cohen, 2001).  In general, they find a positive relationship between 
environmental performance and business performance.  
 
Regarding our robustness checks, when we use investment in general R&D as a measure 
of innovation induced by environmental policies (column 2), we have less support for the 
“weak version” of the PH.  Indeed, in the R&D equation (Panel A), only the variable 
TECH-STANDARDS3 is weakly significant.  The results in the Environmental 
Performance equation (Panel B) are largely unaffected by the change. In the Business 
Performance equation, the coefficient of FIT TOTAL R&D is positive as expected, but 
no longer significant.  Interestingly, the variable STRINGENCY3 is no longer negative 
and significant, but the variable TAX3 becomes negative and weakly significant 
  30indicating that, overall, environmental policies are costly in terms of business 
performance, which was also the conclusion in our preferred version.  
 
When we use a “0-1” environmental performance variable (column 3), there is no change 
in the Environmental R&D equation, and almost no change in the Environmental 
Performance and Business Performance equations.   Finally, when we use the evolution 
of shipments as a measure of business performance (column 4), the two first equations 
are, of course, not modified.  In the Business Performance equation, the coefficient of 
FIT ENVIRONMENTAL R&D retains the expected positive sign, but is no longer 
significant.  Interestingly, as in column (2), the variable STRINGENCY3 is no longer 
negative and significant, but the variable TECH STANDARD2 becomes negative and 
significant again confirming the finding that environmental policy has a detrimental 
effect on financial performance. Overall, the results of our preferred version appear 
robust.  
      
6.  Concluding remarks   
 
 
Overall, the richness of this database has allowed us to assess the empirical validity of the 
Porter Hypothesis, through improved understanding of the channels of influence between 
environmental policy and business performance. In general, we find strong support for 
the ‘weak’ version of the hypothesis, qualified support for the ‘narrow’ version of the 
hypothesis, and qualified support for the ‘strong’ version of the hypothesis. The last two 
sets of results have important public policy implications. 
 
With respect to the ‘weak’ version of the hypothesis, it is reassuring to find that 
environmental policy induces innovation (as reflected in R&D expenditures).  Indeed, it 
would be surprising if this were not the case.  Since environmental policy changes the 
relative price of environmental factors of production, it would be surprising if increased 
policy stringency did not encourage facilities to identify means of economising on their 
use.  
  
  31With respect to the ‘narrow’ version of the hypothesis, the finding that more flexible 
‘performance standards’ are more likely to induce innovation than more prescriptive 
‘technology-based standards’ has important implications for public policy, and supports 
the trend toward ‘smart regulation’ found in many OECD countries.  Performance 
standards induce innovation by giving firms the incentive to seek out the optimal means 
to reduce their environmental impacts. While we do not find this to be true of market-
based instruments, this may be due to the fact that, in practice, such measures are 
frequently applied at too low a level to induce innovation.  
 
And finally, there is some indirect support for the ‘strong’ version of the hypothesis 
through the finding that environmental policy induces investment in environmental R&D, 
and this, in turn, has a positive effect on business performance. However, the direct effect 
of environmental policy stringency on business performance is negative, and greater in 
size than the indirect positive effect mediated through R&D.  As noted above, this may 
mean, for instance, that a large part of the investments necessary to comply with 
regulation represent additional production costs, such as through investment in end-of-
pipe abatement. In terms of the PH, “innovation only partially offset the costs of 
complying with environmental policies”.   
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